http://graham.main.nc.us/~bhammel/RICO/complaint.html#VIII
Plaintiffs aver on information and belief, and upon reasonable
investigation and research that Federal RICO laws 18 USC 1961-1968
do not frustrate the goals of any laws regulating insurance in either
the States of North Carolina or of New Jersey, and further that
The Western District Federal Court of The State of North Carolina
has jurisdiction in this matter:
1) Federal District court has jurisdiction by statute under
1. 18 USC 1964(a)
2. 28 USC 1331
3. 28 USC 1339
2) There is Diversity of Citizenship, 28 USC Sec. 1332
regarding the tortious actions alleged and violations of
18 USC 1962 (RICO), and 18 USC 1951 (Hobbs) by Defendants,
since continuity of these actions spans a time when Plaintiffs
lived in the State Of New Jersey until February 1996, and
thereafter in the State of North Carolina.
4) There is a further complete diversity of citizenship since the
Defendants’ States of incorporation are the State of Illinois
and possibly New Jersey, while Plaintiffs are residents of the
State of North Carolina.
Plaintiffs’ allegations are directly against State Farm
Indemnity, a wholly owned subsidiary of State Farm Mutual, and
therefore also against State Farm Mutual which does business in
many States of the United States; the home offices of State Farm
Mutual are in the State of Illinois, of which it is a citizen,
while State Farm Indemnity, upon information, belief and reasonable
investigation is licensed only by the State of New Jersey, and the
State of Illinois to do business only within those States, and
that it does business only or primarily within the State of New
Jersey.
5) The Parent company, State Farm Mutual does business in the State
of North Carolina and has representatives in The Western District
of North Carolina. On information and belief, State Farm Mutual
is a Foreign Corporation doing business in the State Of North
Carolina.
6) Based on the preceding, the allegations contained herein
constitute a matter which affects Interstate Commerce, and
presents a condition of “complete diversity of citizenship”; the
matter, therefore, falls within Federal Jurisdiction, and
specifically again under 18 USC 1951(b)(3) of the Hobbs Act.
7) Although there does exist a RICO provision in the North Carolina
General Statutes, GS 75D 1-14, which appears to be an elaboration
of 18 USC 1962, and explicitly prohibits the prohibited acts of
18 USC 1962, Plaintiffs cannot find such a cognate provision in
the State of New Jersey. From these circumstances and further
supporting documentation, it is the conclusion of Plaintiffs
that their appropriate pleadings would be unwelcome in the State
Courts of both New Jersey and of North Carolina.
All the preceding leaves the pursuit of justice possible only
within the jurisdiction of the Federal Western District Court
of North Carolina.
8) There is relevant Federal law regarding patterns of racketeering
activity, RICO, and specifically also with regard to
both mail and and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C 1341 and 18 U.S.C 1343
respectively, as well as extortion, (Hobbs). Therefore, The ERIE
doctrine is irrelevant, and the matters herein should be considered
only within the bounds of Federal Law.
9) The federal law of the preceding paragraph is not in any
“direct conflict” with any laws of the States of New Jersey
or North Carolina, and specifically it does not “invalidate,
impair, or supersede” any laws of these States which regulate
insurance. U.S. Sup. Ct. Humana v. Forsyth, Certiorari, for
9th Cir. No. 97-303.
10) The amount of controversy well exceeds the statutory sum
of $75,000.
The Western District Federal Court of North Carolina is the
only appropriate venue in this matter:
11) Plaintiffs reside, and have resided in Graham County,
North Carolina for longer than three (3) years; Graham
County lies within the Federal Western District of
North Carolina.
12) The Parent company, State Farm Mutual does business in the State
of North Carolina and has representatives in The Western District
of North Carolina.
13) Any change of venue to a different district, for
whatever reason, would cause such economic hardship, physical
distress and possible physical injury to plaintiffs so
that this case could not be litigated, and would negate,
utterly, the pursuit of justice.
III. STANDING AND PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO RELIEF:
The Plaintiffs have standing in this matter, and in the The Western
District Federal Court of North Carolina:
14) Plaintiffs reside, and have resided in Graham County,
North Carolina for longer than three (3) years; Graham
County lies within the Federal Western District of
North Carolina.
103) Any relief from continuing racketeering and extortion activities:
the prohibited acts of RICO and Hobbs, under intervention
provided in 28 USC 1367, that the court can give.
Plaintiffs understand that, ultimately from amendments III
and XI of the constitution and by U. S., Sup. Ct. precedent,
this court may not remove the Cases sited in 17), in the State
of New Jersey to this Federal District Court, thus interfering
with the State’s right to regulation of insurance granted
by 15 USC 20 (The McCarran-Ferguson Act), but Plaintiffs see
no reason why Federal intervention by way of court order is
not allowed and appropriate when the actions (the how, not the
what) of the Defendants’ actions are in violation of US Code,
and when such U.S. Code automatically has Federal District
Court jurisdiction.
104) Compensatory Relief in the form of $60,000,000.00 for direct
and proximately caused damages to life, limb, well being and
finances of Plaintiffs stemming from Defendants’ actions,
as will be outlined and apportioned, which damages will have
such lifelong irreparable effect as severe pain, severe
disabilities and severe impairments, that permanently
prohibit Plaintiffs from being self supporting, productive
individuals.
105) Such compensatory damages, plus interest, as may be verified
and claimed by the persons and entities upon whose behalf
Plaintiffs also complain, by virtue of existing contractual
agreements, in accordance with FRCP Rule 71;
106) Any and all interest accrued by debt to the Internal Revenue
Service of the U. S., during the period of continuing pattern
of racketeering activity, by virtue of Defendants’ destruction
of Plaintiffs’ ability to pay the initial debt.
107) Any damages, plus interest, that may be payable and due, to
the Court itself, in compensation for whatever relief the Court
itself may have accorded the Plaintiffs; this, since Plaintiffs’
inability to defend themselves otherwise is a direct consequence
of the Plaintiffs’ destitution, which is caused by the unabated
insistence on a clear pattern of racketeering activity engaged
in within the “enterprise” that includes claimed “insurance”.
108) All Plaintiffs’ Costs in this litigation, and as well, just
compensation for the destructive and onerous work and effort that
has been forced, under duress and extortion, upon Plaintiffs by
Defendants’ actions; Plaintiffs request special consideration
from the court in a determination of attorneys’ fees, by the
court, in recognition of the work done, and cost of necessary
tools required to act as attorneys, Pro Se.
109) Restitution of all Premiums paid to Defendants, over and above
that which was paid as any minimum required by State Law, for
any services that Defendants have purported to provide, over
any time that State Farm has ever been paid for such purported
services.
[Given, that these purported services, which have been provided
in return for this money, were "insurance" in name only, and that
Defendants' statement to the contrary was an act of deliberate
and calculated fraud, which fraud violates and abrogates any
agreement that may, in any way, be construed as contractual from
any "insurance policy" with State Farm. Plaintiffs entered
this agreement with good faith, while Defendants entered
it not only with "a priori" bad faith, but with "a priori"
design of fraud and design of extortion: this just happens
to be Defendants' "way of doing business" which Plaintiffs
understand as the very definition of a pattern of racketeering
activity that goes well beyond the mere "pattern" that is
understood, in multiple definitions by the various Courts of
the United States.]
110) And finally, any further damages of whatever kind that the
Court may deem suitable, just or appropriate, to Plaintiffs,
the Court, or any persons or entities upon whose behalf the
Plaintiffs also complain.
IX. DEMAND FOR JUDGMENT AND TRIAL BY JURY
111) On the basis of all the foregoing, Plaintiffs demand judgment
for the stated relief, in trial by jury.
X. PLAINTIFFS’ AVERMENT REGARDING RULE 11, FRCP
112) Further extant evidence and argumentation, elucidating the
pattern of racketeering activity, and information which will
be acquired in the process of discovery, will establish the
necessary preponderance of evidence as is required by the
Court in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
113) In particular, with regard to Rule 11 of FRCP, Plaintiffs aver
that all statements and allegations are true upon information,
belief, and reasonable investigation, and further that this
action is not brought with any purpose to harass or defame
Defendants, and further that it is not of any nature that
could be called frivolous.
114) Plaintiffs have, in good faith, attempted to balance the
the necessary requirements of specificity and particularity,
under Rule 9(f) of FRCP to establish sufficiency of this
pleading, with the requirements of concision and directness
under Rule 8(e) of FRCP, all in accordance with Rule 11 of
FRCP.
