Constitutional Tort Claims Essay (Columbia Law)

http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/111/7/Pfander.pdf

RESOLVING THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DILEMMA:

CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CLAIMS FOR

NOMINAL DAMAGES

James E. Pfander

 *Under current law, government officers sued in their personal capacity

for constitutional torts enjoy qualified immunity from liability unless the conduct

in question violates clearly established law. The clear-law requirement

gives rise to the well-known “order of battle” dilemma; a court may dismiss

the action on the basis of unsettled law without clarifying the legal norm.

The Court had for some time attempted to compel greater clarity by directing

lower courts to address the claimed violation of constitutional right first, and

only then to consider the clarity with which it was established. In its 2009

decision in

 

Pearson v. Callahan

, however, the Court changed course. By

restoring the lower courts’ discretion to dismiss on the basis of legal uncertainty,

 

the Court has rekindled the debate over constitutional stagnation.

 

This Essay suggests that constitutional tort claimants should be permitted

 

to avoid the qualified immunity defense by pursuing claims for nominal

 

damages alone. Such nominal claims have a lengthy pedigree, both as a

 

common law analog to the declaratory judgment action and as a remedy for

 

constitutional violations. Because they do not threaten to impose personal

 

liability on official defendants, nominal claims should not give rise to a

 

qualified immunity defense. By seeking only nominal relief, litigants could

 

secure the vindication of their constitutional rights in cases where legal uncertainty

 

might otherwise lead to a dismissal. Such a regime could resolve the

 

qualified immunity dilemma, advancing the acknowledged interest in maintaining

 

a vibrant body of constitutional law without threatening officials

 

with liability for action taken in the shadow of unsettled law.

 

 

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