Case Reference

• Stump v. Sparkman 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978).                                                                 The Court said that if a judge with jurisdiction over criminal matters convicts a defendant of a non-existent crime, then the judge has performed a “judicial act” in “excess of his jurisdiction.”  The Supreme Court has formulated the two-prong functional test to determine whether an act is judicial. The first prong of the functional approach asks whether the function is one “normally performed by a judge.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362.
• In Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-31 (1991), the U.S. Supreme Court held that State officers are subject to § 1983 liability for damages in their personal capacities, even when the conduct in question relates to their official duties.
• King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 968 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971, 106 S.Ct. 351, 88 L.Ed.2d 320 (1985)(although setting bond on an arrest warrant is a judicial act, the act of deliberately misleading the police officer who was to execute the warrant about the identity of the person sought was nonjudicial);
•  2.     County of Sacramento v. Lewis 523 U.S. -118 S. Ct 1708 (1998).
• The Court defined “shocking conduct” as a violation of the 14^th amendment when a person demonstrates “intent to harm or worsen (a defendant’s) legal plight.”
•  3.     Smith v. Wade 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
• A plaintiff may be awarded punitive damages against an individual defendant “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless and callous indifference to the federally protected right of others.”
• 4. United States v. Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010)
• any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
• beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• 5. United States v. Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008).
• 6.     Carey v. Piphus 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
• The Supreme Court held that mental and emotional distress is compensable under 1983 if the plaintiff can prove it.
•  5.     Wisconsin v. Constantineau 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
• The Court held that the label or characterization given to an individual by “posting” though a mark of a serious illness to some, is to others such a stigma or badge of disgrace that procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.
•  6.     Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).
• The Court said that generally due process requires some notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of a protected interest.
•  7.     Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, 247, U.S. 464, 476, (1918). Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co. 242 U.S. 294, 403 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900).
• It is a violation of the due process clause for a State to enforce a judgment against a party to a proceeding without having given him an opportunity to be heard before final judgment is entered.
•  8.    Monroe v. Pape (1961).
• A party can sue officials acting under color of law for constitutional violations.
• In Monroe v. Pape, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, writing for the Court, held that the section in question was meant “to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official’s abuse of his position.” 365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 172. Through the Civil Rights statutes, Congress intended “to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.”
•  9.     Dennis v. Sparks 449 U.S 24 (1980)
•  Held: The action against the private parties accused of conspiring with the judge is not subject to dismissal. Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in a challenged action, are acting “under color” of law for purposes of § 1983 actions. And the judge’s immunity from damages liability for an official act that was allegedly the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the judge does not change the character of his action or that of his coconspirators.
•  10.Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
• Held:
• 1. Judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer, such as petitioner, acting in her judicial capacity. Pp. 466 U. S. 528-543.
• (a) Common law principles of judicial immunity were incorporated into the United States judicial system, and should not be abrogated absent clear legislative intent to do so. Although there were no injunctions against common law judges, there is a common law parallel to the § 1983 injunction at issue here in the collateral prospective relief available against judges through the use of the King’s prerogative writs in England. The history of these writs discloses that the common law rule of judicial immunity did not include immunity from prospective collateral relief. Pp. 466 U. S. 528-536.
• (b) The history of judicial immunity in the United States is fully consistent with the common law experience. There never has been a rule of absolute judicial immunity from prospective relief, and there is no evidence that the absence of that immunity has had a chilling effect on judicial independence. Limitations on obtaining equitable relief serve to curtail or prevent harassment of judges through suits against them by disgruntled litigants. Collateral injunctive relief against a judge, particularly when that relief is available through § 1983, also raises a concern relating to the proper functioning of federal-state relations, but that
• Page 466 U. S. 523
• concern has been addressed directly as a matter of comity and federalism, independent of principles of judicial immunity. While there is a need for restraint by federal courts called upon to enjoin actions of state judicial officers, there is no support for a conclusion that Congress intended to limit the injunctive relief available under § 1983 in a way that would prevent federal injunctive relief against a state judge. Rather, Congress intended § 1983 to be an independent protection for federal rights, and there is nothing to suggest that Congress intended to expand the common law doctrine of judicial immunity to insulate state judges completely from federal collateral review. Pp. 466 U. S. 536-543.
• 2. Judicial immunity is no bar to the award of attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act. Congress has made clear in the Act its intent that attorney’s fees be available in any action to enforce § 1983. And the legislative history confirms Congress’ intent that an attorney’s fee award be made available even when damages would be barred or limited by immunity doctrines. Pp. 466 U. S. 543-544.

Forrester v. White  the Supreme Court held that when a judge fired a probation officer, he performed an administrative act, protected only by qualified immunity.The Court rejected the argument that judges should have absolute immunity for employment decisions because an incompetent employee can impair the judge’s ability to make sound judicial decisions. The Court also noted that because judges are less able to delegate decision making there is less reason to afford them absolute immunity in contrast to other officials.

• 11.  Zarcone v. Perry (U.S. Court of Appeals 2^nd circuit, 1978)      
• Compensatory and punitive damages    
• “ The abuse of official power here was intolerable, and when a jury has dealt with it severely, as it should, we will not draw fine lines to restrain its dispensation of justice.”
•  This approach is supported strongly by the thrust of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which directs the federal courts to invoke state law remedies as a supplement to federal substantive law when necessary to vindicate fully the civil rights of a meritorious complainant.4 See, e. g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 698-703, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969). Moreover, there is no logical reason why general principles of damages should not apply to a civil rights action.
• The primary purpose of punitive damages is to deter similar occurrences in the future. See Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 347-48 (3d Cir. 1974); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970); see also Comment, Implying Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 9 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 325, 334-37 (1974). It cannot be that it is less important to deter intentional deprivations of fundamental constitutional rights, such as the unlawful dragooning before a star chamber proceeding that occurred here, than it is to deter intentional injuries to personal property interests.5 Therefore, we reject the notion that there is something inherent in civil rights cases, whether or not based on race discrimination, which precludes the award of substantial punitive damages in appropriate instances.
•  
• Furthermore, a total of $100,000 in damages, the greater part of which was punitive, was upheld in the Seventh Circuit in an action for assault and false imprisonment. Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576, 586-88 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997, 73 S.Ct. 1141, 91 L.Ed. 1404 (1953).
•  
• While those cases are factually distinguishable from this one, it is clear that substantial exemplary damages verdicts are appropriate in intentional tort actions not involving constitutional deprivations. A fortiori, it follows that the sizable punitive award assessed against Perry for his blatant disregard of appellee’s constitutional rights cannot be criticized as unprecedented.

In the following cases, courts have found that the judges acted outside of their judicial capacity and were not entitled to immunity: Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988)(state court judge did not have absolute immunity from damages suit under S 1983 for his decision to demote and dismiss a probation officer); Morrison v. Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463 (6th Cir.1989)(state court judge was not entitled to judicial immunity in connection with order declaring moratorium on issuance of writs of restitution from December 15 through January 2, as judge was acting in administrative and not judicial capacity); King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 968 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971, 106 S.Ct. 351, 88 L.Ed.2d 320 (1985)(although setting bond on an arrest warrant is a judicial act, the act of deliberately misleading the police officer who was to execute the warrant about the identity of the person sought was nonjudicial); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262 (6th Cir.1984)(juvenile court judge’s initiation of criminal prosecution and civil contempt proceeding against father for child support in arrears constituted nonjudicial acts); New Alaska Development Corporation v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir.1988)(receiver appointed by state court to manage business assets of an estate was entitled to absolute derivative judicial immunity, but receiver was not absolutely immune from allegations that he stole assets or slandered parties, as such alleged acts were not judicial); Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816, 102 S.Ct. 93, 70 L.Ed.2d 85 (1981)(holding a contempt proceeding and ordering plaintiff incarcerated were not judicial acts where controversy that led to incarceration did not center around any matter pending before the judge, but around domestic problems of plaintiff former wife who worked at the courthouse); Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938, 100 S.Ct. 1331, 63 L.Ed.2d 772 (1980)(allegedly repeated communications to the press and city officials which were critical of police lieutenant, and the improper instigation of criminal proceedings against the lieutenant by judge as part of a racial campaign to discredit lieutenant were not judicial acts).