ANTITRUST CHECK LIST
HORIZONTAL ARRANGEMENTS
A. Horizontal Price Fixing (ShermanAct §1)
- Current Law—Illegal Per Se (Socony-Vacuum)
- Exceptions: if fits one of permissible factors then rule of reason is applied
- Justifications making it Rule of Reason/ Defenses:
- Improvement of market conditions (Chicago Board)
- Unsuccessful cartel/monopoly (U.S. Steel)
- Aggregate data dissemination/trade association (Maple Flooring)
- Price/market stabilization (Appalachian Coal)
- Safety defense (National Society of Professional Engineers) (rejected excuse)
- Public interest/education (BrownUniversity)
- State action doctrine
- Efficiency through integration (BMI)
- Product is competition itself/necessity of regulation (NCAA)
- Parent-subsidiary (Copperweld)
- Open competition plan/firm specific data dissemination (American Column)
- Reasonable prices (Trenton Potteries)
- Learned profession (Goldfarb)
- Horizontal maximum price fixing (Maricopa)
- Structure of industry
- Cartel behavior
- Public interest served
- Facts peculiar to firm’s operation
- History and duration
- Homogeneity of products
- Inelasticity of demand
- Elimination of service and quality competition
- Rejected justifications:
- General Rule of Reason Analysis Factors:
- Suspicious Factors suggesting Price Fixing
- a. fungible commodity/product homogeneity
- b. highly price inelastic demand (no good substitutes)
- c. excess capacity
- d. high barriers to entry
- e. lots of entry in time of excess capacity
- f. market concentration
- g. conscious parallelism (disguised price fixing)
*** Suggestive factors lead to qualified per se rule (Container Corporation)
B. Market Division (Sherman Act §1)
- Current Law—Per Se Illegal (BRG of Georgia)
- Factors in Analysis:
- Relevant geographic market
- Economic effect
- Components of same entity
- Free riders
- Cooperative association (Topco)
- Rejected Justification:
C. Group Boycotts (ShermanAct §1 + FTCA §5)
- 1. Current Law—Per Se Illegal if have Market Power (Northwest Stationary)
- 2. Factors in Analysis:
- Alternative means of redress
- Barrier entry
- Common plan/boycott behavior
- Product need not be essential
- Market power or absence thereof (+25% >)
- 3. Rejected Justifications:
- Public policy
- Free riders
- 4. Potential Justifications:
- Free riders possibly/economic efficiencies
- Heavily regulated industries/due process (Silver)
- Absence of market power leads to rule of reason (Northwest Stationary)
- Efficiency through integration (Rothery)
- D. Monopolization (Sherman Act §2)
- Current law—Rule of Reason (Alcoa)
- a. possession of market power
- b. willful acquisition or maintenance of that power
- Justifications/Defenses:
- Current law—Rule of Reason (Alcoa)
- Thrust upon
- Natural monopoly
- Achieved by natural growth
- Legitimate business reasons
- United Shoe Fiasco
- Rejected Justifications:
- Factors in Analysis:
- Geographic and product market
- Price elasticity of demand
- Unreasonable restraint on trade
- Efficiency
- Mere size not determinative (US Steel Corp)
- Intent of monopolist (Aspen Skiing Co.)
- Barriers to entry
- Impermissible Monopoly
- Essential monopoly doctrine
- control
- b. inability to duplicate
- c. denial of use
- d. feasibility
- hoarding a critical raw material
- coercing supplier to deal or to charge higher prices
- E. Predatory Pricing (Clayton §2)
- 1. Current Law—Illegal Per Se
- 2. Determing if Predatory Pricing Exists:
- a. price below VC (variable cost) suggests predatory pricing (Areeda and Turner)
- b. price below MC
- Factors in Analysis:
- almost impossible achieve (McGee)
- duration of process (Matsushita)
- absence of motive
- practice in foreign market not determinative of domestic market
- actual harm, not speculative
- F. Mergers (Clayton §7)
- a. relevant market (product + geographic)
- b. effect of merger substantial lessen competition
- Current Law—Rule of Reason
- Analysis:
- Analysis Factors:
- Avoids concentration in incipiency
- Market foreclosure
- Market share
- Trend toward concentration
- Reason for trend
- Number of firms
- HHI/DOJ guidelines
- Elimination of potential competitor/ What would happened without merger?
- Overlapping markets
- Barriers to entry
- Potential reciprocity
- Relevant Markets:
a. Product Market
- Outer boundaries of product market are determined by cross-elasticity of demand (Brown Shoe)
- Substitutability (Continental Can)
b. Geographic Market
- Defined by effect on competition (PNB)
- Failing firm defense
- Efficiency through integration
- Defenses:
- G. Antitrust Standing/Private Litigant
- injury type antitrust law were intended to avoid
- direct injury
- VERTICAL ARRANGEMENTS
- Resale Price Maintenance (ShermanAct §1)
- Current Law—
- Minimum price fixing is Per Se Illegal with Exceptions
- Maximum is Rule of Reason looking for anticompetitve effects(State Oil)
- Exceptions to Minimum:
- must have actual agreement
- direct agents or on consignment allowed (no passing of title)
- Factors of Analysis for Minimum Price Fixing:
- Suggest retail price allowed
- Unilateral actions allowed
- Means of agreement
- Boycott can achieve (Klor’s, Inc.)
- Vertical minimum price fixing = horizontal minimum price fixing
- Compare with vertical non-price restraints
- Factors of Analysis for Maximum Price Fixing:
- Conscious parallelism is permissible
- Vertical maximum price fixing = horizontal maximum fixing
- Defenses:
- License of Patent (GE)
- Territorial Allocation
- Current Law—Rule of Reason (Sylvania)
- Factors of Analysis:
- Intrabrand vs. interbrand
- Efficiency
- Effect on competition
- Avoids free riding
- Agent-dealer distinction not used
- Small or failing firm
- EXCLUSIVE DEALING (Clayton §3)
- Current Law—Rule of Reason unless Substantial Share of the Market
- Factors of Analysis:
- Share of market/foreclosure of market share
- Positive economic effect
- both parties can plan operation
- reduces risk of opportunistic behavior
- protects reputation
- Likelihood conduct will cause anticompetitve effects
- TYING (Sherman§1, Clayton §3)
- Current Law:JeffersonParish Test
- one product or two
- market power with tying product
- likelihood of obtaining market power with the tied product
- efficiency factors
- Factors of Analysis:
- Effect on competition related to tied product
- Beneficial effects of tying
- abuse monopoly power
- separate products
- Method of implementing prices
- Increased barriers to entry
- Franchise generally single product
- Single brand can be the relevant market (Eastman Kodak)
- Future integration possible
- Sophistication of customers
- Defenses:
- New industry defense
- JURISDICTION/PROCEDURES
- Interstate Commerce
- Current Law—Must be in interstate commerce antitrust laws to apply
- Analysis Factors:
- Focus on defendant’s conduct (Summit)
- Manufacture not commerce
- Effects must be felt withinUnited States
- Patent Law
- Patent May assign rights (i.e. through license)
- Patent Pools are legitimate Settlement of disputes
- Filed Rate Doctrine
- Antitrust law does not apply to rates filed with a regulatory agency
- Rate cannot be challenged because state action doctrine
- State Action Doctrine
- Current Law—Midcal Test
- policy must be articulated and affirmatively expressed by state
- actively supervised by state
- Factors of Analysis:
- Part one—state is only legislature
- Policy must be clear
- Municipality bestowed with specific powers from state legislature—satisfies Midcal one and two
- City government cannot be sued for treble damages—only injunction
- Compulsion not necessary, authorization sufficient (Southern Motor Carrier)
- Permissive regulation doesn’t satisfy active supervision (Ticor)
- Judicial review inadequate for state supervision
- Peer review committees are agents of state if satisfy due process
- Noer-Pennington Doctrine
- sham exception
- International Jurisdiction
- jurisdiction—conduct outside US , must have substantial effects within US
- comity—if conflicting laws, must be compelled by foreign entity, otherwise within jurisdiction